TY - ECHAP KW - aquatic resources KW - common property KW - marine KW - fishing grounds AU - Edella Schlager AU - Elinor Ostrom AU - Terry L. Anderson AU - Randy T. Simmons AB - Since different bundles of rights affect the behavior of resource users, it is crucial that in analyzing common pool resources the types of property rights held by users be made explicity. Defining how fishing grounds may be used substantially affects whether fishers resolved common pool resource dilemmas. The term "common property" can't begin to capture the diversity of rights held in common by resource users. Instead, a more precise language that captures meaningful differences among different property rights regimes. AN - 93-02625 BT - The political economy of customs and culture: Informal solutions to the commons problem C5 - 41 pp. CN - HD1286.P64 1993 CY - Lanham, MD DA - 01/1993 DB - Pennsylvania State University Libraries LA - English N1 -

Credited in Warren Bibliography as Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, R93-10

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N2 - Since different bundles of rights affect the behavior of resource users, it is crucial that in analyzing common pool resources the types of property rights held by users be made explicity. Defining how fishing grounds may be used substantially affects whether fishers resolved common pool resource dilemmas. The term "common property" can't begin to capture the diversity of rights held in common by resource users. Instead, a more precise language that captures meaningful differences among different property rights regimes. PB - Rowman & Littlefield PP - Lanham, MD PY - 1993 SN - 0933595123; 978-0933595125 SP - 13 EP - 41 ST - Property-rights regimes and coastal fisheries T2 - The political economy of customs and culture: Informal solutions to the commons problem TI - Property-rights regimes and coastal fisheries: An empirical analysis UR - http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/26587148 ER -