@inbook {910,
	title = {Property-rights regimes and coastal fisheries: An empirical analysis},
	booktitle = {The political economy of customs and culture: Informal solutions to the commons problem},
	year = {1993},
	note = {<p>Credited in Warren Bibliography as Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, R93-10</p><p>Also available online from Google Books</p>},
	month = {1993},
	pages = {13-41},
	publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield},
	organization = {Rowman \& Littlefield},
	address = {Lanham, MD},
	abstract = {Since different bundles of rights affect the behavior of resource users, it is crucial that in analyzing common pool resources the types of property rights held by users be made explicity. Defining how fishing grounds may be used substantially affects whether fishers resolved common pool resource dilemmas. The term "common property" can{\textquoteright}t begin to capture the diversity of rights held in common by resource users. Instead, a more precise language that captures meaningful differences among different property rights regimes.},
	keywords = {aquatic resources, common property, fishing grounds, marine},
	isbn = {0933595123; 978-0933595125},
	url = {http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/26587148},
	author = {Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom},
	editor = {Terry L. Anderson and Randy T. Simmons}
}
