@article {696,
	title = {The T{\textquoteright}OLCHE{\textquoteright}, a Maya system of communally managed forest belts: The causes and consequences of its disappearance},
	journal = {Agroforestry Systems},
	volume = {18},
	year = {1992},
	month = {May 1992},
	pages = {149-177},
	abstract = {<p>The T\&$\#$39;OLCHE\&$\#$39; is a protected forest belt about 10\&ndash;20 m wide that runs through the Mayan landscape on the limits of the maize fields of the farmers. This study explores its traditional use and management and traces how it has changed in the last 30 years in the study village in Yucat{\'a}n, Mexico. A major change is in its extent; little remains of the 10\&ndash;20\% of the area it occupied in the past. Two of the causes of this are identified as being a credit programme of the local bank and 1973 state legislation concerning cattle. The causes and consequences of this decline are discussed in relation with other farmer-perceived changes in overall landuse, including a fall in maize yields. The ecological roles of the T\&$\#$39;OLCHE\&$\#$39; are examined. It is argued that the T\&$\#$39;OLCHE\&$\#$39; plays an essential role in the regeneration of the fallow vegetation and in the maintenance of biological diversity. The case of the T\&$\#$39;OLCHE\&$\#$39; suggests the need for a diversified and politicized look on Common Property Resource Management.</p>},
	keywords = {common property management, fallow regeneration, Maya, shelterbelts, shifting cultivation, traditional landuse},
	doi = {10.1007/BF00115409},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00115409},
	author = {G. G. A. Remmers and H. De Koeijer}
}
@book {338,
	title = {Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action},
	year = {1990},
	month = {1990},
	pages = {280},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	organization = {Cambridge University Press},
	address = {Cambridge [England]; New York},
	abstract = {The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market has been uniformly successful in solving common-pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrum here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore the conditions under which common-pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved.
Dr. Ostrum first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways -- both successful and unsuccessful -- of governing the commons. In contrast to the propositions of the "tragedy of the commons" argument, common-pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forest, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. (author)},
	keywords = {aquatic resources, case studies, common property management, commons, land tenure, land use, social choice},
	isbn = {0-521-37101-5},
	url = {http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1119430541},
	author = {Elinor Ostrom}
}
